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ARE LEVERAGED BUYOUTS A FORM OF
GOVERNANCE ARBITRAGE?
Dale A. Oesterle *
I. INTRODUCTION
From the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) until the
recent subprime financial crisis, the nation witnessed a remarkable growth
in “going-private” acquisitions. 1 As a percentage of total acquisitions, the
purchase of publicly-held companies by privately-held companies jumped
approximately twenty points. 2 Scholars, with some notable exceptions, 3
point to the increased compliance costs of SOX as a significant cause of the
change. 4
* Professor and J. Gilbert Reese Chair in Contract Law, The Ohio State University Moritz
College of Law.
1. Christian Leuz, Alexander J. Triantis & Tracy Y. Wang, Why Do Firms Go Dark? Causes
and Economic Consequences of Voluntary SEC Deregistrations 4 (European Corporate
Governance Institute, Finance Working Paper No. 155/2007, 2004), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=592421 (documenting a spike in going private that is largely attributable
to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act). Charts, Leveraged Buyout Market and Going Private, MERGERS &
ACQUISITIONS, Feb. 2008, at 93–95. By 2007, the high point in the growth of going private
transactions, LBOs accounted for 30 percent by value of the total value of mergers and
acquisitions. In 2001, it was only two percent. The growth from 2002 to 2007 was nothing short of
an explosion.
2. COMM. ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION, INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMM. ON
CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION (2006) [hereinafter CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION, INTERIM
REPORT].
3. Some believe that an increased availability of low cost credit, facilitating leveraged
financing, is the primary cause of the going-private acquisitions. Allison Taylor & Ruth Yang,
Evolution of the Primary and Secondary Leveraged Loan Markets, in HANDBOOK OF LOAN
SYNDICATIONS AND TRADING (Allison Taylor & Alicia Sansone eds., 2007). See also William
Bratton, Private Equity’s Three Lessons for Agency Theory, 3 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 1
(2008). The cause is overstated. A company must show a profit to leverage successfully and at
issue is why private equity buyouts offer the prospect of substantial profits to buyout funds.
Adding leverage to existing profit flow does not seem to explain the attraction of going private,
given the premiums paid in the acquisitions. Some target companies are, for example, showing no
profits. Buyout funds must rationally believe that they can increase profits to justify cashing in on
the new leveraged position. The belief that an increase in profits is available is the subject of the
speculation on the role of SOX, for example. See also Andreas Beroutsos & Conor Kehoe, A
Lesson in Governance from the Private Equity Firms, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2006, available at
http://www.mckinsey.com/aboutus/mckinseynews/equity_firms.asp. (Authors are directors of
McKinsey & Company) (“[P]ublic equity markets still face a real challenge from private equity
. . . not from . . . its giddy use of financial leverage. Rather the challenge comes from private
equity’s ability to align owners and managers more effectively.”).
4. E.g., William J. Carney, The Costs of Being Public After Sarbanes-Oxley: the Irony of
“Going Private”, 55 EMORY L. J. 141 (2005); Ellen Engel, Rachel M. Hayes & Xue Wang, The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Firms’ Going Private Decisions, 44 J. OF ACC. & ECON. 116 (2007). For
an argument that SOX’s encouragement of going private acquisitions is a benefit to the public by
reducing the public trading of securities by firms that are prone to financial fraud, see Ehud
Kamar, Pinar Karaca-Mandic & Eric Talley, Going-Private Decisions and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002: A Cross-Country Analysis (Kauffman-RAND Inst. for Entrepreneurship Pub. Policy,
Working Paper Series No. WR-300-2-EMKF, 2008), available at http://repositories.cdlib.org/
berkeley_law_econ/fall2005/12/.
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Scholars who believe SOX legislation and rules to be a primary cause
of the popularity of going-private acquisitions point primarily to two SOX
effects that are significant increases in regulation of publicly-traded
companies: (1) increased audit requirements on internal controls, most
notably Section 404, and (2) increased exposure of executives to liability
from, among other provisions, certification requirements in Section 302 and
906. 5 There is, however, another feature of going-private acquisitions that
merits study as a significantly contributing cause: the ability of controlling
shareholders to structure the board of directors free of new constraints from
SOX and from listing requirements of our national exchanges. 6
Private buyout groups have used their freedom to construct tailored
boards of directors to substantially alter the management structure and style
of the public companies they take over. 7 Such changes deviate significantly
from the “good corporate governance” rules many favor for publicly-traded
companies. Participants in the deals believe the management changes add
significant value to the firm by increasing firm returns. In other words,
going-private acquisitions could have an element of “governance arbitrage”
about them. 8 If correct, that is, if the portfolio companies of private buyout
funds are more successfully managed than those same companies when
publicly traded, then we should question our traditional norms of “good
corporate governance” for publicly traded companies.
This essay discusses the non-scientific evidence of the management
changes that follow going-private transactions and encourages empirical
scholars to test the hypothesis that going-private transactions enable more
efficient and effective board oversight and management.
II. THE TYPICAL GOING-PRIVATE TRANSACTION:
LEVERAGED BUYOUTS DEFINED
A going private transaction is defined as one in which a publicly-traded
company reorganizes its capital structure to avoid the public reporting
requirements of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. A publicly-held
company must file annual and quarterly public reports under section 13(b)
of the 1934 Act. 9 A company is publicly-held if it is listed on a national
securities exchange, 10 has registered a public offering, 11 or has more than

5. E.g., Mary Calelgari & Howard Turetsky, Selling to Escape Compliance Costs, MERGERS
& ACQUISITIONS, Sept. 1, 2006, at 54.
6. See discussion infra Part IV.
7. Id.
8. The term “governance arbitrage” is used in Beroutsos & Kehoe, supra note 3.
9. See also Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, § 13a, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (2004)) and Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, § 15d, 48 Stat. 881
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (2004)).
10. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 12(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78l (2004).
11. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12d2-2 (2008).
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five hundred shareholders and ten million dollars in assets. 12 A publiclyheld company escapes the periodic filing requirements if it reduces the
number of its record shareholders of each of its registered securities to less
than three hundred and delists all securities from any national exchange. 13
At that point, the company becomes privately-held and has the option of
“going dark” (i.e., suspending its public filing of annual and quarterly
reports). 14 Most companies choose to stop filing the public reports. 15 A few
privately-held companies continue to file public reports because they either
owe contractual obligations to debt holders, or think it is prudent to
generate a record of reports that eases their return to the public capital
markets in the future. 16
There are several methods of going private. In single-firm
reorganizations, a public company executes a reverse stock split, buying
back its own stock (often in a self-tender offer), or engages a merger with a
subsidiary to reduce the number of shareholders to less than three
hundred. 17 In acquisitions by one company of another independent
company, a privately-held company purchases a publicly-traded company.
The privately-held company is referred to as a “strategic” buyer if it is
another operating company (usually in the same industry). 18 More
frequently, the privately-held acquiring company is a newly-formed

12. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 §12(g)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C. §78l (2004). 17 C.F.R.
§240.12g-1 (2008).
13. Paul R. Bessette, Michael J. Biles, Christopher W. Ahart & Helen V. Heard, Considering
Going Dark?, FIN. EXECUTIVE, Nov. 2006, at 2.
The first step in going dark is delisting the company’s securities from their exchange.
This action eliminates the registration requirements of Section 12(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. Exchange Act Rule 12d2-2(d) permits a company to file an
electronic application to withdraw a class of securities from listing on the exchange in
accordance with the exchange’s rules.
Id. Some authors use a Rule 13e-3 filing to signal a going private transaction. The Rule requires
special disclosures in going private transactions. Rule 13e-3 filings only apply, however, to single
firm transactions and to two-firm transactions in which a member of the target management team
participates in the buyout. E.g., Carney, supra note 4. However, hostile buyouts or other buyouts
in which the entire management team is excluded from participation in the buyout vehicle at the
time of the acquisition are omitted. Buyouts with management participation, also known as
management buyouts, create severe conflict of interest problems that have long troubled the
courts. E.g., Dale Oesterle & Jon R. Norberg, Management Buyouts: Creating or Appropriating
Shareholder Wealth?, 41 VAND. L. REV. 207 (1988). Rule 13e-3, requiring among other things,
that the issue declare the transaction to be “fair,” is the SEC’s effort to control the conflict of
interest problems.
14. Leuz, Triantis & Wang, supra note 1, at 1.
15. Id. at 7.
16. Robert P. Bartlett, III, Going Private But Staying Public: Reexamining the Effect of
Sarbanes-Oxley on Firms’ Going Private Decisions, 5 (Univ. Ga. Sch. of Law, Research Paper
Series, Paper No. 08–003, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1088830.
17. Leuz, Triantis & Wang, supra note 1, at 4–5.
18. Bartlett, supra note 16, at 7.
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subsidiary of a “financial” buyer, a pool of money gathered specifically to
purchase this and similar companies. 19
Acquisitions by financial buyers sparked the remarkable increase in
going-private acquisitions in the early part of this decade. 20 These buyers
are predominately private equity funds, also known as buyout funds. 21 The
buyout funds, which are typically structured as limited partnerships or
limited liability companies, are run by well-known fund management firms
in the form of buyout partnerships or companies. 22 The management firms
solicit capital from elite investors to avoid registration or filing
requirements under a multitude of potential regulatory provisions. 23 The
trade-off for investors is that the buyout fund’s investors are locked-in for a
period of time. The terms of capital investment in the buyout fund do not
grant robust redemption rights that an investor can trigger quickly should
she want out of the fund. 24 Once a buyout fund is capitalized, the
management firm finds a suitable publicly-traded target company and
negotiates an acquisition. The fund creates a shell company as the
acquisition vehicle and funds the purchase of the target company’s
securities with a portion of the buyout fund’s cash capital and borrowings
from other financial players. 25 The shell company, typically in a two-stage
acquisition (cash for control followed by a back-end, cash out merger),
acquires a super-majority of the voting shares and thus control of the target
company. 26 The shareholders of the target company receive cash and the
buyout fund, occasionally with a few other investors who buy a few
minority shares, becomes the dominant, residual controlling shareholder. 27
The target company becomes a “portfolio” company of the buyout fund. 28
Once a buyout fund has exhausted its capital by purchasing portfolio
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. at 8.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 8.
Ludovic Phalippou & Oliver Gottschalg, The Performance of Private Equity Funds 7 (EFA
Moscow
Meetings,
2005)
(unpublished
Working
Paper,
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=473221).
23. The funds raise money in private placements (avoiding the Securities Act of 1933
registration requirements), have less than five hundred investors (avoiding the reporting
requirements of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934), are not mutual funds (are exempt from
the Investment Company Act of 1940), never take more than twenty-five percent of their
investment capital from regulated pension funds (avoiding regulation by ERISA), and avoid any
acts that would get them classified as a broker/dealer, a bank, an underwriter, a market-maker, or a
commodity pool. The fund manager is careful to avoid regulation under the Investment Advisors’
Act of 1940. See Robert C. Illig, What Hedge Funds Can Teach Corporate America: A Roadmap
for Achieving Institutional Investor Oversight, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 225, 275–78 (2007).
24. See id. at 280–81.
25. Hence, the leverage in “leveraged buyout.” See Bartlett, supra note 16, at 9.
26. See Joshua M. Koenig, A Brief Roadmap to Going Private, 2004 COLUM. BUS. L. REV.
505, 520 (2004). This often occurs after a first stage of stock acquisitions.
27. Id. at 533.
28. David A. Weisbach, The Taxation of Carried Interests in Private Equity, 94 VA. L. REV.
715, 722 (2008).
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companies, it is “fully invested” and the buyout fund’s management firm
renews the cycle by creating new buyout funds for future acquisitions.
A mature buyout fund does not intend to keep portfolio companies
long-term. 29 Rather, it seeks to sell all the acquired portfolio companies for
a sizable profit and return cash proceeds to the buyout fund’s investors
within five to seven years. 30 To realize profits, the buyout fund resells the
portfolio companies through public offerings or to other private buyers or
strategic buyers in negotiated deals. 31 Realizing a profit on resale is much
more than mere asset speculation; the buyout company expects to enhance
significantly the portfolio company’s value by installing new management
in the portfolio company so as to correct flaws in the previous
management’s decisions, strategy and practices. For example, new
management may unlock the company’s value by “spinning off” or selling
assets 32 to make better use of company assets or capital, and streamlining or
modernizing operations.
A fund specializing in buyouts is distinguishable from other important
types of private-equity funds with similar structures. A fund’s type is
defined by its choice of investments and holding or exit strategies. 33
Venture capital funds take equity positions in start-up and emerging
companies (primarily those developing technology), with a turnaround goal
of five to ten years. 34 These funds are usually more patient than buyout
funds and only take full management control when the existing
management stumbles badly. 35 Hedge funds take highly-leveraged, partialequity positions to make pure asset speculation plays or to pressure the
company to make immediate operational changes. 36 The hedge fund’s
investment turnaround goals are as short as one day and as long as two

29. Geoffrey Colvin & Ram Charan, Private Equity, Private Lives, FORTUNE, Nov. 27, 2006,
at 190, available at http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2006/11/27/
8394344/index.htm.
30. Per Stromberg, The New Demography of Private Equity, GLOBALIZATION OF
ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS 3–26 (World Economic Forum, Working Papers Vol. 1, 2008),
available at http://www.weforum.org/pdf/cgi/pe/Full_Report.pdf (finding almost 60% of private
equity fund investments exit more than five years after the initial investment. In addition, the
length of time portfolio companies remain under the control of private equity firms has increased
in recent years. Less than 6% of buyout transactions end in bankruptcy or financial distress. This
translates to a default rate of 1.2% per year, compared to an average default rate of 1.6% for U.S.
corporate bond issuers and 4.7% for U.S. junk bond issuers).
31. Gary Barnett, Collateralized Fund Obligations: An Example of a Securitization of Private
Equity Fund Investments (CFO), 1653 PLI/CORP 459, 463 (2008).
32. A spinoff grants assets to existing shareholders as an in specie dividend on their stock.
Otherwise the management sells the assets to independent parities.
33. Christopher W. Sanchirico, The Tax Advantage to Paying Private Equity Fund Managers
with Profit Shares: What is it? Why is it Bad?, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1071 (Summer 2008).
34. Illig, supra note 23, at 270–71.
35. Id.
36. E.g., Henny Sender, Hedge Funds Show Resilience in Thorny Times, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 28,
2008, available at http://us.ft.com/ftgateway/superpage.ft?news_id=fto012820081457435278.
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years. 37 Hedge funds do not often buy control of a firm and do not hold any
single investment for long. 38
Buyouts of a company are usually met with substantial hostility in the
company’s locality. When a buyout fund installs new managers and
relocates facilities elsewhere, the local citizenry and political leaders are not
happy, particularly if the move is overseas. 39 Mike Huckabee, for example,
successfully derailed Mitt Romney’s campaign for the Republican
presidential nomination in 2008 with an oft-repeated line: “I believe most
Americans want their next president to remind them of the guy who they
work with, not the guy who laid them off.” 40 Romney was one of the
founders of Bain Capital, a well-known buyout firm. 41
When managers of the target firm are involved in the buyout, they are
charged with disloyalty to local interests and conflicts of interest with the
target company’s shareholders. 42 If the buyout fund’s operating maneuvers
fail and a healthy local company ends up in bankruptcy, local citizens are
further incensed. Support for a buyout comes only when locals are
convinced their local company is failing and a buyout fund could keep it
alive, even if the company must be changed to survive. Leveraged buyout
popularity rests exclusively with the quietly happy investors of the to-bepurchased target companies, who usually receive a healthy 20 to 40 percent
premium price for their shares, 43 and investors in the buyout fund 44 and its
management firm 45 that enjoy heady returns from the fund’s activities.
III. PRIVATE EQUITY FUND RETURNS
Data on the returns of private equity funds is limited because neither the
management firms, nor the funds or the investors in the funds are required
37. See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS (2003),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/hedgefunds0903.pdf.
38. Id.
39. See, e.g., Phil O’Connor, In Prestige or Jobs, or Both: “We’ll be taking a hit”, ST. LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH, Jul. 12, 2008, at A8.
40. Perry Bacon Jr. & Michael D. Shear, Hopefuls Clash in Debate as 1st Southern Primary
Nears,
WASHINGTON
POST,
Jan.
11,
2008,
at
A9,
available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/01/10/AR2008011004007_pf.html.
Chelsea Clinton, others have noted, took time off from a private equity fund to campaign for her
mother.
41. Jenny Strasburg & Peter Lattman, Credit Crunch Rocks Bain, As Funds Fall Up to 50%,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 2008, at C1.
42. Brody Mullins & Kara Scanell, Politics and Economics: Buyout Firms Join Lobbying
Efforts, WALL ST. J., Sept. 1, 2006, at A4.
43. United States Government Accountability Office Report to Congressional Requesters,
Private Equity: Recent Growth in Leveraged Buyouts Exposed Risks That Warrant Continued
Attention, Sept. 2008, GAO-08-885 at 18.
44. Beroutsos & Kehoe, supra note 3. The top funds have routinely returned healthy premium
over market indexes.
45. Buyout firms take twenty percent of the profits and management fees. Victor Fleischer,
Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership Profits in Private Equity Funds, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 22
(2008).
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to file public reports. 46 Although the funds generate performance reports,
the managers of the funds give the reports to investors under strict
contractual duties of confidentiality. 47 Investors, such as public university
endowments that must publicly report on their investments, are not invited
to invest. Moreover, there are no Securities and Exchange Commission
rules to standardize the content of the reports. 48 Financial economists
studying the industry must instead rely on voluntary reporting in private
equity trade publications by management firms. 49 Private equity trade
publications providing summaries of the industry data note that many funds
do not report voluntarily and admit that the non-reporting firms are the most
likely to be the worst performers. 50 The data in the publications may,
therefore, contain the effects of an over-reporting of desirable results in the
summary. 51 However, there may also be an under-reporting of superior
results, if some firms do not want to attract regulatory and political attention
to their successes. 52 Moreover, and most importantly, much of the studies
are dated and do not address the 2002-2007 period at issue in this essay.
A well-known study on private equity returns, conducted by Steven N.
Kaplan and Annette Schoar, analyzed the returns of private equity funds
that were fully liquidated between 1980 and 2001. 53 Kaplan and Schoar’s
surprising conclusion was that those investors would have received better
returns by investing in an index fund for the S&P 500. 54 Their results were
largely confirmed in a study that updates the data to 2003. 55 Both studies
used only liquidated funds to focus on cash payments and, therefore, omit
projections of gains in still invested funds that may have been fully invested
seven or more years before the end date of the studies, 1994 or 1996 to date.
The approach, therefore, largely omits data from funds raised and invested
in the 2002 to 2007 boom period. 56 An academic study based solely on the
period in issue here, from 2002 to 2007, is not known to this author.
There is no doubt that the current economic credit crisis has adversely
affected the private equity industry as well as the financial industry in
general. This year’s growing financial crisis has dried up sources of capital

46. Rod Newing, Private Equity: Coming Out of the Shadows, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2007.
47. Id. at 7.
48. Steven N. Kaplan & Antoinette Schoar, Private Equity Performance: Returns, Persistence,

and Capital Flows, 60 J. FIN. 1791, 1791 (2005) (“Private equity, as the name suggests, is largely
exempt from public disclosure requirements”).
49. Id.
50. Bratton, supra note 3, at 14.
51. Kaplan & Schoar, supra note 48, at 1794.
52. Newing, supra note 46; see also Bob Kennedy, Weathering a Storm, Beset by Attacks from
Washington, Private Equity is on the Defensive, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS, Jul. 2007, at 61.
53. Kaplan & Schoar, supra note 48, at 1791.
54. Id. at 1821.
55. Phalippou & Gottschlag, supra note 22.
56. Bartlett, supra note 16, at 22; see also Bratton, supra note 3, at 3.
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for buyout fund activities. 57 With the loss of funding, the number of
buyouts has declined precipitously. 58 Several buyouts announced in 2007
failed to close in 2008 as financial backers withdrew. 59 Fund investors,
often under pressure themselves to marshal cash, have exercised their
withdrawal rights. 60 A substantial number of newly-created funds have
failed to raise sufficient capital to begin operations.61 It may take several
years for the financing of buyouts to return. However, the slowdown in
private equity funding in 2008 does not necessarily mean funds raised after
2002 and before 2008 that are fully-invested, or that funds which have
otherwise yet to liquidate, are not doing well. With the S&P 500 down
substantially since early 2008, 62 private equity funds may still be outperforming the market. 63
In any event, the trade publication StateStreet.com has published data
on the five year period of interest in this essay that is in sharp disagreement
with Kaplan & Schoar’s conclusions. 64 The StateStreet.com study is based
on reported private equity fund returns from January 1997 to September
2007 and is not limited to liquidated funds. A table of the results is
contained below.
Strategy

Number of Funds

Commitments ($B)

Long-term IRR%

Buyout:

619

$ 813

15.70%

Venture Capital:

600

$ 204

12.42%

Other:*

162

$ 136

14.13%

1,381

$1,153

15.03%

N/A

N/A

Total:
S&P 500 Index:

10.51%**

57. Heidi Moore, Deal Makers: Ripe for layoffs?, WALL ST. J., Feb. 21, 2008, at B1.
58. See Top Deals of 2008, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS, Feb. 2008.
59. See Dana Cimilluca, Cassell Bryan-Low & Jenny Strasburg, As Deals Crash, Investors

Flee Hedge Funds, WALL ST. J., Mar. 29, 2008, at B1.
60. Peter Lattman and Keenan Skelly, Calstrs Will Invest Less In Latest Blackstone Fund;
Move Hints at Worry Over Private Equity In Public Markets, WALL ST. J., Sept. 4, 2008, at C3.
61. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, As Hedge Funds Seek Cash, Market Suffers, Report Says, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 7, 2008, available at http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/11/07/as-hedge-fundsseek-cash-market-suffers-report-says/?scp=1&sq=hedge%20fund%20no%20investing&st=cse.
62. See Peter A. McKay, Dow Loses 45.10 as Comeback Fails to Erase All of Big Loss, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 5, 2008, at C1 (As of March, the Standard and Poor’s 500 was down 9.6%).
63. Cf. Sender, supra note 36. (It was banks that “blew up the world,” not hedge funds).
64. Id.; State Street Private Equity Index, http://www.statestreet.com/analytics/
is_179_private_edge.html (last visited May 20, 2008). (Private Equity Index composition and
dollar-weighted internal rate of return, net of management fees and carried interest, measured
January 1, 1997 through September 30, 2007. * “Other” includes distressed investment,
mezzanine and special situations funds; ** Compound annual growth rate 1957 through Sept. 30,
2007).
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From the table, one sees that the private equity funds easily beat the S&P
500 Index over the sample period.
As noted above, some critics will claim that only successful funds are
represented in the sample because only successful firms will voluntarily
report. The reports are marketing for new fund creation. 65 Support for the
StateStreet.com data comes from the tremendous success in capital-raising
shown in buyout funds during the same period. 66 Investors in record
numbers and in record amounts flocked to the funds. This growth of
investment capital was fueled by the funds’ high returns. 67 Kaplan and
Schoar would suggest that the investors were misled perhaps, but from
another perspective, perhaps they were not. Investors with skin in the game
(cash at risk) believed that the funds offered above market returns.
Even if the Kaplan and Schoar finding is correct, that buyout funds in
general do not provide above-market returns, the data on many funds
remains encouraging. First, funds established early in a buyout-friendly
economic cycle did very well and funds established late in the cycle did
poorly. 68 Therefore, studies on buyout returns must define and take into
account these cyclical periods. 69 Second, buyout funds that produced capital
gains early in a cycle are the most likely to remain successful throughout
the cycle. 70 In other words, the best determinate of a buyout fund’s future
success appears to be the nature of its past success. For example, top-tier
private equity firms like The Blackstone Group, Kohlberg Kravis Roberts &
Co., and Bain Capital LLC, showed spectacular returns while second tier
firms struggled to match the S&P 500. 71 Investors who poured money into
the successful funds were likely attracted by such returns. Selecting
successful funds was, to a degree, predictable. Yet oddly enough, Kaplan
and Schoar’s data, weighted by buyout fund size, did not reflect this
finding. Third, Kaplan and Schoar’s study does not account for risk. 72 Some
studies claim that diversified going private funds show less market
volatility than the S&P 500 and therefore, should show smaller returns. 73
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, is that the Kaplan and Schoar data
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Kaplan & Schoar, supra note 48, at 1794.
Charts, supra note 1.
State Street, supra note 64.
Kaplan & Schoar, supra note 48, at 1819.
A study could catch the middle of a cycle. This is particularly a problem for going private
studies because going private in large numbers is a very recent phenomenon.
70. Phalippou & Gottschlag, supra note 22, at 24; Kaplan & Schoar, supra note 48, at 1813.
71. See, e.g., Maryland Tax Education Foundation, Press Release: Latest Research Concludes
that Private Equity Funds Fail to Deliver Premium Rates, July 23, 2008, available at
http://www.marylandtaxeducation.org/privateequityfund.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2008).
72. Kaplan & Schoar, supra note 48, at 1797.
73. See Joost Driessen, Tse-Chun Lin & Ludovic Phalippou, A New Method to Estimate Risk
and Return of Non-Traded Assets From Aggregate Cash Flows: The Case of Private Equity
Funds, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14144, June 2008), available at
http://.ssrn.com/abstract=965917.
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was based on net returns reported by fund investors, not gross returns to the
buyout fund. 74
The difference between net returns to investors and gross returns to the
funds is due substantially to the fees paid to the management firm. 75
Management firms charge a number of fees that are deducted from the gross
returns of the buyout fund. 76 These fees are usually two percent of the
capital committed to the fund per year, a twenty percent slice of the profits
distributed (the “carried interest”), 77 and transaction fees on the purchase
and sale of portfolio companies. 78 A management firm that returns eight
percent or more to its investors has done very well when the net return of
eight or more is translated into gross returns.
The observers claim that such a division of profits, with twenty percent
or more going to the management firm that made a very small capital
investment, is highly inequitable. 79 They necessarily discount as
insignificant that the division creates the incentives for the management
firm that generate the higher returns to the investors. 80 Without those
incentives, investors may very well receive less robust returns. 81
Nevertheless, the buyout fund’s higher returns have, of course, attracted the
attention of Congress, which wants to tax these firms at higher rates than
they currently pay. 82
Therefore, Kaplan and Schoar’s data, based on net returns, supports a
claim that the buyout funds generate substantial gross returns that exceed
meaningful relevant market indexes. 83 The StateStreet.com data also
supports the claim. 84 Nevertheless, what is not entirely clear is the source of
gross returns. The gross returns of private equity funds do not appear to be
pure leverage plays. They are also related to the increased performance of
portfolio companies under the new management hired by the buyout fund.
Data on portfolio companies that are sold back to the public after a period
of buyout fund management show gains in both market value and in
accounting-based performance figures. 85 Note that the Kaplan and Schoar
74.
75.
76.
77.

Kaplan & Schoar, supra note 48, at 1791.
Fleischer, supra note 45, at 8–9.
See id.
This usually occurs after the investors receive an eight percent return and is subject to a
clawback if distributions drop. Id. at 8, 22.
78. Illig, supra note 23, at 287.
79. Fleischer, supra note 45, at 5–6.
80. Illig, supra note 23, at 283–88.
81. Id.
82. See Howard E. Abrams, Taxation of Carried Interest, 116 TAX NOTES, July 16, 2007, at
183.
83. See Shourun Guo, Edith S. Hotchkiss & Weihong Song, Do Buyouts (Still) Create Value?,
Address to the Swedish Institute for Financial Research Conference on The Economics of the
Private Equity Market, (Mar. 21, 2008).
84. State Street, supra note 64.
85. See generally Bratton, supra note 3.
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position suggests that performance gains in the portfolio companies are
entirely captured by the buyout fund management company and denied to
the buyout fund investors. It is hard to believe that buyout fund investors
are this gullible. In any event, the gross returns of buyout funds deserve
careful attention.
IV. MANAGEMENT CHANGES IN PORTFOLIO COMPANIES
An important characteristic of buyout fund activity is their
experimentation with and development of unique management styles. 86
Management restructuring seems to have aided significantly in creating
value within newly-acquired portfolio companies. 87 It is this hypothesis that
needs further statistical investigation. This essay contains a brief summary
of antidotes that should encourage such a study.
The reduction in the number of shareholders in a going private
acquisition has inherent structural advantages. The reduction facilitates
investor monitoring of target company managers and heightens
accountability. 88 The reduction more closely aligns managers’ interests with
the interests of the shareholder. 89 And the reduction enables buyout funds to
implement quickly, and without opposition, optional structural changes that
provide substantial managerial advantages. 90 The changes in management
strategy include changes in management structure and compensation,
changes in financial structure that affect management incentives, and
changes in internal control procedures. 91 Each of these strategic changes is
considered below.
First, management firms of buyout funds radically alter board structure
and management compensation of portfolio companies. 92 The buyout fund
managers, for example, reduce the number of inside directors holding
management positions in the portfolio company. The fund replaces
management directors with directors appointed from within the
management firm. 93 The CEO of the newly-private portfolio company is
rarely the Chairman of the Board and often not even on the Board of
Directors. 94 The CEO often attends board meetings but cannot vote. 95
86. Allan Holt, co-head of US Buyout Group, The Carlyle Group, when asked about going
private deals, remarked, “[t]he number one reason is the availability of capital. It opens up a
universe of possibilities.” See generally Colvin & Charan, supra note 29.
87. Beroutsos & Kehoe, supra note 3, at 15; Colvin & Charan, supra note 29, at 190; Emily
Thornton et al., Going Private, BUS. WEEK, Feb. 27, 2006, at 52, available at
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/06_09/b3973001.htm.
88. Beroutsos & Kehoe, supra note 3, at 15.
89. Id. at 15.
90. Colvin & Charan, supra note 29, at 190.
91. Id.
92. Beroutsos & Kehoe, supra note 3, at 15.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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Buyout management firms also reduce the number of outside directors. The
few outside directors that are seated are portfolio industry experts, those
affiliated with other portfolio industry participants or industry service
companies. 96 The new outside directors are not “independent” as that term
is often used in modern corporate governance parlance. This is in conflict
with modern “good corporate governance” standards that rely primarily on
the placement of outside, independent directors on powerful, independent
board sub-committees such as the audit, compensation, and nomination
committees. 97
For compensation, all board members in portfolio companies receive
nominal amounts of cash, not options or stock, and they are expected to
purchase equity positions in the company. 98 Inside directors, members of
the buyout fund management group, profit from their position in the buyout
fund. Outside directors profit from their positions in related industry
positions. Executive pay in cash is heavily indexed to portfolio companyspecific performance goals based generally on revenue increases. 99
Compensatory options in portfolio stock take three to five years, or even
longer, to vest. 100 Unlike typical executive compensation agreements in
public companies, there are few cash bonuses tied only to stock price and
no golden parachutes or other change-of-control protections. 101 The board
and management have “skin in the game.” In comparison to executives in
publicly-traded companies, the executives in buyout fund portfolio
companies participate more heavily in upside gains and downside losses
than do the executives in publicly-traded companies. Managers in publiclytraded companies participate in the upside gains of investors but also do
well even if investors do not (they do not participate in the investors
downside losses). 102 In publicly-traded companies, the board is
compensated handsomely in cash, in options that vest quickly (from six
months to three years), in cash and equity bonuses at year-end, and in
golden parachute severance payment packages. 103 Executive pay packages
in publicly-traded companies are complex and opaque and much less
dependent on an evaluation of company performance indexed to an industry
standard than are pay packages in portfolio companies. 104

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Colvin & Charan, supra note 29, at 190.
See generally Beroutsos & Kehoe, supra note 3, at 2.
Colvin & Charan, supra note 29, at 190.
Id.
See Press Release, Boston Consulting Group, What Public Companies Can Learn from
Private Equity (June 2006) at 8, available at http://www.bcg.com/impact_expertise/publications/
files/What_Public_Companies_Can_Learn_from_Private_Equity06.pdf.
101. Id.
102. Colvin & Charan, supra note 29.
103. See Press Release, Boston Consulting Group, supra note 100, at 8.
104. Id.
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Second, buyout funds use more leverage by substantially increasing a
portfolio company’s debt-to-equity ratio. The funds “make the equity
sweat.” The increased leverage directly affects portfolio company
management incentives. Debt-financing takes advantage of “cheap credit”
and has come in for considerable criticism of late as portfolio companies
struggle to maintain solvency in 2008’s tight credit market. But increased
leverage also substantially contributes to the management incentive
environment favored by buyout firms. High levels of leverage cause
portfolio company management to develop an intense focus on company
cash flow, squeezing working capital to maximize cash revenue. 105
Marginal operations are sold quickly and cash expenses are monitored
carefully. 106 The use of leverage complements the changes in executive
compensation packages for portfolio company executives by increasing the
manager’s personal stake in the extreme upside gains and in the downside
losses.
Third, buyout management firms usually impose a new reporting
system on portfolio company accountants and auditors. Most significantly,
the outside auditor reports directly to the buyout fund, as well as to the
portfolio company. This is an important and underappreciated change in
oversight because it eliminates the classic problem of auditor conflicts-ofinterest in publicly-traded companies. In publicly-traded companies,
auditors are hired by company management to whom they report and on
whose practices they report. Auditors, concerned about management
satisfaction with their services because management pays them, report for
the benefit of investors whose money is entrusted to those managers. 107 The
effect of the conflict is that bad information has a tendency to get
overlooked or understated in the audit report. 108 In implementing SOX,
Congress attempted to remedy the conflict of interest by empowering
publicly-traded companies’ independent audit committees. The audit
committee, under SOX, must consist of independent outside directors that
not only hire auditors but that also create and oversee an internal financial

105. Colvin & Charan, supra note 29, at 190.
106. Id.
107. Colin Blaydon & Fred Wainwright, Surprise! Valuation Guidelines Are Being Adopted,

VENTURE CAPITAL J., June 2005, at 58, 59, available at http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/
pecenter/research/Valuations.pdf (Burgiss Group and J. P. Morgan auditing products used by
investors to analyze private equity portfolio holdings. Reports go directly to investors). See, e.g.,
Private Informant, Private Equity Database Reporting and Analytical Services,
http://www.burgiss.com/index-23.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2008); see also, e.g., Press Release,
J.P. Morgan, JPMorgan Private Equity Fund Services Launches DealVault Technology (Apr. 1,
2008), available at http://www.jpmorgan.com/cm/ContentServer?c=TS_Content&pagename=
jpmorgan%2Fts%2FTS_Content%2FGeneral&cid=1159339629741. Consider the hue and cry if
football umpires were paid by football coaches for calls made during the game itself. That is what
we do with auditors.
108. CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION, INTERIM REPORT, supra note 2, at 116.
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control system. 109 SOX also adds penalties for managers that compromise
the integrity of any audit. Under SOX, however, the basic conflict remains:
shareholders are passive consumers of audit reports paid for by those who
are audited, managers. In portfolio companies, auditors that are hired by and
report to the primary investor, the buyout fund, have stronger incentives to
serve their client’s desire to have a dependable and accurate assessment of
portfolio company affairs that includes both the good and the bad. Buyout
firms demand accurate, truthful information about their portfolio companies
to assess the competency of a company’s managers; auditors are compelled
to tell even a harsh truth to the client-investors or suffer reputational
damage as unreliable auditors.
One of the surprises in the reports of portfolio management practices is
that buyout funds usually impose SOX internal control requirements on
portfolio companies in both auditing and disclosure systems. The internal
control procedures of the publicly-traded companies do not change when
the companies are taken private. It is only the auditors’ hiring and reporting
that changes. It is difficult to determine whether buyout funds opt to use
SOX internal controls because they are optimal management devices or
because having the systems in place makes the portfolio company easier to
resell in a public offering.
V. THE TOTAL EFFECT
By implementing structural changes to management, buyout funds seek
to better align the interests of a company’s management with its
investors. 110 The buyout fund places and compensates executives so that
they have a substantive financial interest in the company that mirrors the
stake of the fund. 111 And a buyout fund reforms a board of directors that
will be more efficient in defining company strategy, and in supporting and
monitoring the company’s executive officers. 112
Executives in portfolio companies have remarked on the clarity of their
mission and function. 113 For example, Thomas von Krannichfeldt, the CEO
of AZ Electronic, once noted that “[t]he focus on cash flow is very intense
. . . [m]ost employees who came from Clariant [AZ’s previous publiclytraded owner] had never seen that. As a consequence, what they’d done
with regard to controlling inventory or working capital wasn’t terribly good,
and we could improve on that a lot.” 114 Public companies often disagree
over what to measure, whether it is earnings per share, return on equity,

109.
110.
111.
112.
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Id. at 115; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(2) (2004).
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EBITDA, or return on net assets. 115 In private equity portfolio companies,
there is no confusion—cash flow is king. 116 Jon Luther, the CEO of Dunkin
Brands, explains: “There’s now a very different discipline in how you
spend money. If it doesn’t grow the business, why would you do it?” 117
Executives in private equity portfolio companies also have noted that
they have more freedom to take risks and make difficult but necessary
decisions. 118 According to Donald J. Gogel, the CEO of private equity firm
Clayton Dubilier & Rice, Inc., portfolio company executives do not have a
gun pointed at their heads all the time. 119 There are no rigid internal
hierarchies to prevent decisions and investors appreciate longer time
horizons. 120 In publicly-traded companies, executives often feel the need to
focus on quarterly results and are more risk averse to longer term gambles.
CEOs of portfolio companies also spend more time on operations and
less time talking to shareholders, analysts, and the media. Some estimate
that CEOs in publicly-held companies spend only sixty percent of their time
on operations and forty percent of their time on public relations. 121
Similarly, boards in publicly-held companies must deal with investor
relations, usually through an Investor Relations Subcommittee, and worry
about multiple shareholder ballot initiatives. There are no such diversions in
a portfolio company.
Finally, portfolio company executives, chosen by management firms,
are paid larger cash salaries. 122 As a result, public companies have lost
some of their brightest stars to private equity firms. 123 The portfolio
company pay packages are not subject to the harsh glare of the financial
press and Gretchen Morgenson of the New York Times. 124 For example,
VNU, a Dutch global information and media company, paid General
Electric’s (GE) superstar vice chairman David Calhoun $100 million to
become VNU’s Chairman of the Executive Board and CEO. 125 GE’s Paul
115. See Colvin & Charan, supra note 29, at 190. EBITDA refers to Earnings Before Interest,
Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Thornton, supra at 87, at 4.
119. Id. at 2.
120. Id.
121. See, e.g., PAUL ARGENTI & JANIS FORMAN, THE POWER OF CORPORATE
COMMUNICATION 64 (2002).
122. Sanchirico, supra note 33, at 73.
123. See generally Joann S. Lublin, Star Search: Can Public Companies Compete for Talent
Against Private-Equity and Venture-Capital Firms? We Talked to Both Sides, WALL ST. J., Apr.
14, 2008 at R8.
124. Gretchen Morgenson is assistant business and financial editor and a columnist at the New
York Times. She has covered numerous topics relating to private equity, finance and Wall Street,
including issues surrounding excess of executive compensation. See Gretchen Morgenson,
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/m/gretchen_morgenson/index.html
(last visited Nov. 11, 2008).
125. Colvin & Charan, supra note 29, at 4.
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Bossidy also left, and joined Cerberus. 126 Procter & Gamble’s CEO, A.G.
Lafley, complained in 2006 that he had “lost a half-dozen people” to buyout
funds. 127 A well-known executive recruiter during that time noted that
“[t]op candidates are no longer waiting around to be recruited to a public
company, instead they’re jumping to a private-equity firm and watching for
the right opportunity to become a CEO. It wasn’t like this ten years ago.” 128
The pay package comes with risk, however. A far larger share of
executive pay is tied to the performance of the business. 129 Top executives
are required to put a substantial amount of their own money into the
buyout. 130 The CEO of Dunkin Brands once noted: “I insisted that all
officers invest personally. Management has a substantial amount of their
personal money in this. It makes a huge difference in the 40 officers of the
company when they show up for work . . . . [T]hey have an ownership
mentality rather than a corporate mentality.” 131
The day-to-day operation of a portfolio company’s board of directors is
also very different from the typical board of directors in a publicly-held
company. The portfolio company’s board is smaller and consists only of
representatives of the private equity fund and industry experts whose
explicit job is to help management create and execute strategy. 132 Steven
Denning, Chairman of the Board of General Atlantic, notes that “[t]he
board is far more involved in assisting the company.” 133 Jon Luther, the
CEO of Dunkin’ Brands, praised the board’s connections and advice,
saying: “Our three partners are able to connect us with people we otherwise
couldn’t meet. For example, the Carlyle folks introduced us to one of their
investors in Taiwan, and we soon had an agreement for 100 Dunkin’
Donuts stores there.” 134 Pramod Bhasin, the CEO of GenPact, echoed
Luther’s comments: “Their access to markets, to people, to the right
headhunters, the right lawyers—that’s a huge help to companies that are
newly independent, because without it, we’d have to swim for it
ourselves.” 135
In sum, private equity firms have figured out how to attract and keep
the world’s best managers, focus managers extraordinarily well, provide
strong profit-based incentives, free managers from distractions, provide
managers with expert outside help they can use, and maximize their
productive time and output.
126.
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The only structural drawback is, perhaps, a potential conflict of interest
inside the private equity firm that could affect portfolio company
operations. Although managers of the buyout fund are agents of the fund’s
investors, the managers of the fund may be tempted to promote their own
interests as fund managers over the interests of the fund’s investors by
raising new funds or keeping redemptions low in existing funds. An
example might be the efforts of a buyout fund manager to conceal a
portfolio company’s troubles so as to keep buyout fund valuations up. This
conflict can translate into directors from the managers of the fund to the
managers of the portfolio company acting in ways that are not in the best
interests of the fund’s passive investors. The ability of the fund’s passive
investors to monitor the fund managers’ conduct is the constraint that
controls the conflict. Most buyout fund investors have substantial
inspection rights written into their equity purchase agreements that enable
them to monitor fund managers and fund portfolio companies’
performance. 136
VI. PUBLIC REACTION
The general media reaction to rapid growth of private equity buyouts in
the five year period after 2002 has been largely negative. The new wealth of
private equity management firms has been questioned, while the media has
assumed some form of cheating has occurred. 137 Wealth increases reflected
in the buyout funds in this period were often regarded with suspicion and
cynicism. A typical example occurred in a cover story in Newsweek in July
of 2008, where co-authors Evan Thomas and Daniel Gross called privateequity firms “Masters of the Universe” and “the true aristocrats,” noting
that “even their secretaries, it seems, have English accents.” 138 Attempting
to indicate hubris, the authors said, “Private-equity partners are not just in it
for the money (though the successful ones make tons of it), but for the
power to reshape whole industries.” 139 Imagine that! Of course, another
word for reshape is “improve.” 140
The media suspicion of private equity firms is possibly due to
discomfort over such a naked exhibition of the operation of the shareholder
primacy principle. In conflicts among corporate constituencies such as
shareholders, managers, creditors, employees, local citizens, or even the
environment, American corporate law directs boards of directors to favor
136. Leuz, Triantis & Wang, supra note 1; Charts, supra note 1, at 93–95.
137. See Kennedy, supra note 52, at 61.
138. Evan Thomas & Daniel Gross, Taxing the Super Rich, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 10, 2008,

http://www.newsweek.com/id/32992?tid=relatedcl. Daniel Gross had spilled a great deal of ink
criticizing private equity funds at Newsweek the past two or three years. His articles are a classic
populist media attack on the industry. See, e.g., Daniel Gross, Borrowers are out in the Cold,
NEWSWEEK, Mar. 3, 2008, http://www.newsweek.com/id/114713.
139. Thomas & Gross, supra note 138.
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the interests of the residual claimants of the profit flow, the shareholders,
under the shareholder primacy principle. Despite some ambiguity and
slippage in case law and state statutes, the shareholder primacy principle,
although tattered a bit, still defines the primary duty of corporate managers.
In publicly-traded companies, there is more room for the ambiguities and
openings to have an effect and for companies to consider interests other
than simple profit motives. 141
In portfolio companies run by private equity firms, there is no
ambiguity or slippage in the operation of the shareholder primacy
principle—the companies are run solely to make money for the buyout
fund, which is the portfolio company’s controlling shareholder. It is an
illustration of shareholder primacy on a large scale in its purest form acting
on companies of intense interest to the public. It is no surprise that the
operation of such companies unsettles those who wish for “softening” of the
“rough edges” of capitalism. 142 Those “compassionate capitalists” 143 and
those who believe in democratic socialism surely are hardwired to despise
the operation of buyout funds. 144
It is important to note that buyout funds and their portfolio companies
are not the primary culprits in the current economic downturn. While both
are suffering like everyone else, the companies that have failed first with
compounding results were publicly-traded financial institutions.
VII. LESSONS FOR PUBLICLY-TRADED COMPANIES
Publicly-held companies cannot mimic the portfolio companies of
private equity buyout funds. Regulations prohibit some of the structural
changes, and “Best Practice” corporate governance rules pushed by a wellintentioned, concerned lobby may retard others. 145 However, there are
lessons from private equity practice that a public company may want to
consider using. A publicly-held company could limit inside directors to
representatives of large shareholders, although it is unlikely that companies
will do so. 146 Managers who run these companies will want to stay on the
board. Similarly, it is possible to have auditors hired by and reporting to
large investors in publicly-traded companies, but it is unlikely that
companies will do so. Nevertheless, it is an intriguing proposal that a
publicly-traded company’s audit subcommittee ought to be composed
entirely of representatives of large shareholders. Such success in private
equity practice supports the idea.
141. State constituency statutes, for example, often only apply to publicly-traded companies.
142. John Vinocur, France’s Tough Guy, Files Down His Rough Edges, INT’L HERALD TRIB.,
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The use of outside directors to assist and advise rather than to oversee is
obstructed by regulations and listing rules. At present, we are infatuated
with the outside (i.e., non-executive), “independent” director as a
monitoring force in publicly-held companies. A publicly-traded company,
by law, cannot limit outside directors to “non-independent” industry
experts. 147 SOX legislation mandates the audit committee in a publiclytraded company consist entirely of independent directors who do not
“accept any consulting, advisory, or other compensatory fee from the
[company]” and are not “an affiliated person of the [company] or any
subsidiary thereof.” 148 An affiliate is a person that controls the company,
directly or indirectly and “control” means to possess “the power to direct or
cause the direction of management and policies of a [company], whether
through the ownership of voting securities, by contract, or otherwise.” 149
Aside from the obvious problem with the definition—that all outside
directors seem to be affiliates under the “by contract, or otherwise”
language—the rule also seems to prohibit executives in companies that
provide professional services to the company, such as lawyers, consultants,
and accountants, from serving as outside directors. 150
Similarly, under stock exchange listing requirements, unless a listed
company has a fifty percent majority owner, a majority of directors must be
“independent” and the board must have entirely independent subcommittees
on nominating and corporate governance, compensation, and audit. 151 A
director is not “independent” if he has a “material relationship” with the
company. 152 A material relationship can “include commercial, industrial,
banking, consulting, legal, accounting, charitable and familial
relationships.” 153 Notably, the rule’s exception for a company with a
majority owner recognizes that such a company may benefit from a board
structure that replicates that of a portfolio company. In short, it would be
very difficult for publicly-traded companies to replicate the practice of
private equity portfolio companies of using affiliated industry experts as
outside directors.
The two practices of private equity firms that public companies could
match more easily, perhaps, are the compensation packages offered to
executives and the greater use of leverage in financial structures to raise
working capital. Again, neither is likely to be widely incorporated in
publicly-traded company practice. Executive compensation practices in
147.
148.
149.
150.
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publicly-held companies suffer from considerable pressure to keep
compensation obscure and complex so as to avoid public condemnation.
The possibility of increased profit with high levels of debt-financing is not
attractive to managers and other employees who have a vested interest in
the company’s survival. The recent credit crisis may sour our taste for
leverage for years to come.
The tension between the governance recommendations for publiclytraded companies and privately-held companies is well illustrated in the
dust-up in the United Kingdom between competing “panel-of-expert”
professional commissions, so common in the country. Legal professionals
in the United Kingdom have long championed the use of industry “good
corporate governance” recommendations for its business. In 2003, an
industry working group released the Higgs Report on Corporate
Governance, which advocated the use of independent outside directors on
multiple board subcommittees. 154 The explosion of private equity buyout
funds led to the formation of a second commission focusing on good
governance rules for private equity practice. In the Walker Report of 2007
on Private Equity, the commission came to the conclusion that the Higgs
Report recommendations would not work for private equity firms and
recommended, instead, the limited use of “non-independent” outside
consultants as board members—in essence applauding current practice. 155
The Walker Report was excoriated by Derek Higgs, the author of the 2003
report, 156 and others who wanted the governance standards for publicly-held
companies to be applied to privately-held companies. 157 Walker’s response
was that “it would be ‘dotty’ . . . to insist that private equity firms appoint
independent directors to the boards of portfolio companies they
acquired.” 158 In sum, the pressure from the “good governance community”
is the reverse of what it perhaps ought to be: asking successfully privatelyheld companies to adopt the management practices of their less successful
publicly-traded brethren.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
Since publicly-traded companies are unlikely to be free to match the
management advantages of private equity funds over their portfolio
companies, “governance arbitrage” may always remain an explanatory
incentive for successful going private transactions. Market participants
believe the value added by improved governance practices is substantial and
are eager to invest their own cash on their assessment if other economic
conditions are conducive to an acquisition. Financial economists have yet to
assess whether they are correct, however.

